Trusting-Trust Attack against an Entire Linux Distribution
Recorded: Sept. 8, 2026, 6:11 a.m.
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[2607.24888] Trusting-Trust Attack against an Entire Linux Distribution through Binary Manipulation
Skip to main content Search Log in Search arXiv Press Enter to search · Advanced search Computer Science > Cryptography and Security arXiv:2607.24888 (cs) [Submitted on 27 Jul 2026] Abstract:Ken Thompson's trusting-trust attack, in which a compromised compiler backdoors the programs it builds and reproduces the backdoor in subsequent rebuilds of itself, is widely regarded as a threat specific to compilers. We show that it is not. We construct a complete trusting-trust attack around GNU strip, an ordinary build utility that neither inspects nor generates source code, using only manipulations of finished ELF files. In the bootstrap of the NixOS Linux distribution, a single tampered strip in the binary seed implants a payload that propagates from one generation of strip to the next and survives into the final standard environment after the seed leaves the dependency closure. On a real nixpkgs revision, the attack builds a complete graphical installer without failures and backdoors almost every one of its binaries, enabling arbitrary malicious behavior of the subverted packages. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Software Engineering (cs.SE) Cite as: Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite Submission history From: Aman Sharma [view email] [v1]
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The research investigates extending Ken Thompson's trusting-trust attack, traditionally considered specific to compilers acting as backdoors, to an entire Linux distribution via binary manipulation. The authors demonstrate that this type of vulnerability can be exploited through less scrutinized build utilities rather than just compiler mechanisms. Specifically, they construct a complete trusting-trust attack centered around GNU strip, which is a utility used for building and manipulating ELF files without needing to inspect the source code. This attack relies solely on manipulating the finished ELF files themselves. The mechanism involves implanting a payload at the initial stage of the process, using a single tampered file within the binary seed of the build process. This implanted payload then propagates across successive generations of the strip utility, enduring until it survives into the final standard environment after the dependency closure is complete. This propagation ensures that the malicious code persists throughout the distribution's construction process. The demonstration applies this concept to the bootstrap process of the NixOS Linux distribution. By tampering with a single strip file in the binary seed, the attack successfully embeds a payload that propagates across subsequent build steps and remains present in the final standard environment. Furthermore, when executed against a real nixpkgs revision, the technique allows for the construction of a complete graphical installer without encountering failures. This capability enables the insertion of backdoors into almost every compiled binary within the distribution, thereby providing arbitrary malicious behavior for the subverted packages. |