The specter of AI-enabled bioweapons is a wake-up call for biotech | MIT Technology Review

You need to enable JavaScript to view this site.

Skip to ContentMenuMIT Technology ReviewMIT Technology ReviewThe Big StoryArtificial intelligenceBiotech & healthClimate & energy10 Breakthrough TechnologiesEmTech Future live eventThe Kids issueMenuMIT Technology ReviewMIT Technology ReviewThe Big StoryArtificial intelligenceBiotech & healthClimate & energy10 Breakthrough TechnologiesEmTech Future live eventThe Kids issueBiotechnology and healthThe specter of AI-enabled bioweapons is a wake-up call for biotechIt’s easier than ever to design killer pathogens.
By Jessica Hamzelouarchive pageSeptember 18, 2026Photo illustration by Sarah Rogers/MITTR | Photos GettyEXECUTIVE SUMMARY In recent weeks, leaders of some of the biggest AI companies have warned that the very tech they are developing is dangerous. Last weekend, Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei argued that AI carries serious risk and that progress should be slowed. OpenAI CEO Sam Altman responded on X: “I agree with Dario that we need to pace the frontier.” Those posts came a few days after the AI researcher Jacob Coxon announced that he was leaving a role at Anthropic, charging that neither it nor OpenAI (where he had also worked) was acting responsibly. “The people building AI earnestly believe that it could kill us all by the end of the decade,” he posted on X. Another Anthropic employee, Evan Hubinger, publicly agreed with him. “We really do earnestly believe AI could kill all humans!” he responded on X. “I personally think it is >10% within the next decade.” Related StoryNo one's sure if synthetic mirror life will kill us allRead next One of the ways they fear AI might end us all is by somehow aiding the design, creation, and release of some kind of bioweapon. Let’s take a closer look at why. A bioweapon might be a highly lethal virus that targets people according to their genes. It could be a fungus that wipes out a crop and causes food insecurity. Perhaps it would be a tasteless, odorless toxin that could be slipped into a region’s water supply, undetected.
The concern is that AI tools can be used to help generate agents like these. In 2022, researchers at Collaborations Pharmaceuticals found that it was remarkably easy to do so using an AI “molecule generator” they’d developed to find potential drugs for human disease. In less than six hours, the model generated 40,000 molecules with the potential to serve as chemical warfare agents. Some of them were designed to be even more toxic than known nerve agents. “Without being overly alarmist, this should serve as a wake-up call for our colleagues in the ‘AI in drug discovery’ community,” the authors wrote at the time. It was a wake-up call for David Magnus, a professor of medicine and biomedical ethics at Stanford University, even though he had been assessing the risks associated with the misuse of medical science and biotechnology since the late 1990s. “That was very scary to me,” he says. “Of course, everything since then has just sort of blown up.”
Today, AI bots can answer questions on topics spanning all realms of science. Anyone can use large language models trained on the knowledge and experience of “almost every scientist who ever lived on this planet,” says Dunja Sabra, a biosecurity researcher at the University of Hamburg in Germany. Those models can provide instructions and video training on how to conduct experiments. Combine that with advances in biotech that have made gene editing and synthetic biology tools much more accessible (the “DIY biology” movement has already enabled many people to set up labs at home), and you’ve got a potentially very dangerous situation. “The chances are that someone determined would succeed eventually,” Sabra says. There are safeguards in place. People who want to build new genomes must typically order the pieces of DNA from companies that screen for suspicious requests. Responsible researchers put potentially risky research through rounds of analysis called “red-teaming,” in which independent scientists look for ways the work might be misused, and “blue-teaming,” where others come up with potential mitigations. And AI companies have tweaked their tools in attempts to prevent them from offering up scientific information that could be misused. But none of these protections are ironclad. Related StoryHere’s why AI agents lie and cheat to reach their goalsRead next In a report published last week, Anthropic acknowledged that people had attempted to use its models to explore ways to make the chikungunya virus more transmissible, create a form of bird flu that is more dangerous to humans, and build an “atlas of venom toxin peptides,” among other things. “We’ve got a constant back and forth,” says Magnus. “We have to build better surveillance and screening tools, [but] AI is really good at figuring out ways around them.” We’ll probably need to use AI to find ways to restrict the use of AI, he says. I should add here that not all scientists agree on the level of risk. At a recent media briefing, some biologists at Imperial College London argued that AI tools just aren’t good enough to fully develop bioweapons, and that testing new pathogens requires difficult, time-consuming, human work. Some think the guardrails we have in place are sufficient. And Wendy Barclay, a professor of infectious disease at Imperial, pointed out that, as things stand, the greatest risk of a pandemic isn’t from a bioweapon, but from pathogens that are already circulating. Take H5N1, the bird flu virus that has already killed millions of birds and spread widely through US dairy cattle; last month it was also detected in captive mink at a farm in Utah. Sabra, on the other hand, likes to think five to 10 years ahead. Countries should be strengthening their health-care systems, preparing antidotes to known toxins, and stockpiling medicines, she says: “We need to be prepared.”

Kevin Esvelt, an MIT biologist who invented both technology to fast-track the propagation of a genetic feature through an entire population and ways to limit that technology, echoed these concerns in an X post on Wednesday, stating that a large language model had “disclosed a novel form of bioweapon that I hadn’t realized was possible.” He added, “Please, for the love of God, children, the future of humanity, or whatever you consider holy, let's err on the side of caution here.” This article first appeared in The Checkup, MIT Technology Review’s weekly biotech newsletter. To receive it in your inbox every Thursday, and read articles like this first, sign up here. by Jessica HamzelouShareShare story on linkedinShare story on facebookShare story on emailPopularA fundamental flaw leaves LLMs strikingly vulnerable to attackWill Douglas HeavenAI is more likely than humans to form biases when hiringMichelle KimAI’s recursive self-improvement might not come so quickly after allMichelle KimHere’s why AI agents lie and cheat to reach their goalsGrace HuckinsDeep DiveBiotechnology and healthA startup claims it’s found a drug to make your blood youngGeneration Lab claims its drug combo can “stop the spread of aging” around the body. And it’s looking for influencers to give it a try.
By Antonio Regaladoarchive pageMontana’s plan to become an experimental medical hub just pushed forwardThe state’s effort to expand the “right to try” is making headway, and the first drugs are about to be reviewed.
By Jessica Hamzelouarchive pageSupercooled kidneys have been transplanted into pigs in a “landmark achievement”Kidneys kept at subzero temperatures in pressure-controlled containers can be stored for days before transplantation, raising hopes for longer-term storage of donated human organs.
By Jessica Hamzelouarchive pageScientists just created female clones of male miceThe sex reversal technique could be used to help rescue endangered species, say the researchers behind the work.
By Jessica Hamzelouarchive pageStay connectedIllustration by Rose WongGet the latest updates fromMIT Technology ReviewDiscover special offers, top stories,
upcoming events, and more.Enter your emailPrivacy PolicyThank you for submitting your email!Explore more newslettersIt looks like something went wrong.
We’re having trouble saving your preferences.
Try refreshing this page and updating them one
more time. If you continue to get this message,
reach out to us at
customer-service@technologyreview.com with a list of newsletters you’d like to receive.The latest iteration of a legacyFounded at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1899, MIT Technology Review is a world-renowned, independent media company whose insight, analysis, reviews, interviews and live events explain the newest technologies and their commercial, social and political impact.READ ABOUT OUR HISTORYAdvertise with MIT Technology ReviewElevate your brand to the forefront of conversation around emerging technologies that are radically transforming business. From event sponsorships to custom content to visually arresting video storytelling, advertising with MIT Technology Review creates opportunities for your brand to resonate with an unmatched audience of technology and business elite.ADVERTISE WITH US© 2026 MIT Technology ReviewAboutAbout usCareersCustom contentAdvertise with usInternational EditionsRepublishingMIT Alumni NewsHelpHelp & FAQMy subscriptionEditorial guidelinesPrivacy policyTerms of ServiceWrite for usContact uslinkedin opens in a new windowinstagram opens in a new windowreddit opens in a new windowfacebook opens in a new windowrss opens in a new window

The development of artificial intelligence presents a serious concern regarding the potential for creating bioweapons, prompting warnings from leaders in the AI sector. Executives from major AI companies, such as Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei and OpenAI CEO Sam Altman, have expressed concerns that the pace of AI progress should be slowed due to the inherent risks the technology carries. This apprehension is reinforced by researchers who have worried that the AI technology could be leveraged to aid in the design, creation, and release of lethal biological agents, ranging from highly lethal viruses targeting specific genes to fungi causing food insecurity, or undetectable toxins for water supplies.

The ease with which AI can facilitate the design of harmful biological agents has been demonstrated in previous research. For instance, in 2022, researchers at Collaborations Pharmaceuticals utilized an AI molecule generator to discover forty thousand molecules with the potential to function as chemical warfare agents, some of which were designed to be more toxic than known nerve agents. This discovery served as an immediate wake-up call for the field of AI in drug discovery. Today, large language models possess the capability to answer complex scientific questions across all disciplines and provide instructions for conducting experiments. When combined with advancements in biotechnology, such as accessible gene editing and synthetic biology tools, which have enabled widespread distributed laboratory setups, the potential for dangerous misuse escalates significantly.

While measures to mitigate risk exist, such as requiring oversight for obtaining genetic material and implementing rigorous assessment processes like red-teaming and blue-teaming by independent scientists, these safeguards are not considered entirely sufficient. Anthropic itself acknowledged that attempts were made to use its models to explore ways to increase the transmissibility of pathogens, create more dangerous bird flu strains, and build databases of venom toxin peptides. This suggests that AI is adept at finding ways to circumvent existing surveillance and screening mechanisms.

Disagreement exists among experts regarding the precise level of risk. Some biologists argue that current AI tools are insufficient for developing bioweapons, asserting that creating new pathogens requires complex, time-consuming human work. Others, like Wendy Barclay, contend that the greatest immediate risk of a pandemic stems not from the development of a new bioweapon, but from the circulation of existing pathogens, such as the H5N1 bird flu virus. Conversely, biosecurity researchers like Dunja Sabra predict a risk within five to ten years and emphasize the necessity for countries to strengthen healthcare systems and prepare antidotes to known toxins. A notable concern expressed by some figures, such as MIT biologist Kevin Esvelt, highlights the acute danger, noting that a large language model had disclosed a novel form of bioweapon that was previously unforeseen, urging a cautious approach to future development.