Exposed GitLab project email addresses let attackers push code
Recorded: Sept. 24, 2026, 6:02 p.m.
| Original | Summarized |
Exposed GitLab project email addresses let attackers push code News Featured ShinyHunters claims FBI hack, data theft in PeopleSoft zero-day breach New Windows Defender zero-day blocks Microsoft antivirus updates EvilTokens PhaaS disrupted after compromising 12,000 Microsoft accounts Check Point warns of Management Server zero-day exploited in attacks Exposed GitLab project email addresses let attackers push code FedRAMP VDR & VER: Daily Scans Are Only the Beginning Hackers now exploit critical Roundcube flaw in code injection attacks Windows 11 KB5124010 update released with 46 changes and fixes Tutorials Latest How to access the Dark Web using the Tor Browser How to enable Kernel-mode Hardware-enforced Stack Protection in Windows 11 How to use the Windows Registry Editor How to backup and restore the Windows Registry How to start Windows in Safe Mode How to remove a Trojan, Virus, Worm, or other Malware How to show hidden files in Windows 7 How to see hidden files in Windows Webinars Latest Qualys BrowserCheck STOPDecrypter AuroraDecrypter FilesLockerDecrypter AdwCleaner ComboFix RKill Junkware Removal Tool Deals Categories eLearning IT Certification Courses Gear + Gadgets Security VPNs Popular Best VPNs How to change IP address Access the dark web safely Best VPN for YouTube Forums Virus Removal Guides HomeNewsSecurityExposed GitLab project email addresses let attackers push code Exposed GitLab project email addresses let attackers push code By Bill Toulas September 24, 2026 Private GitLab email addresses that allow developers to push issues or tasks to a project are being deliberately exposed in READMEs, contributing guides, and support pages used to collect bug reports. Modifying the email addressSource: Aikido Build your security blueprint for AI-powered attacks Join Mikko Hyppönen and security leaders from the NFL, CHANEL, and Atlassian for a two-hour digital summit on what AI-speed attacks change, what defenders should stop doing, and how to validate, decide, fix, and re-validate at machine speed. Related Articles: Developer Bill Toulas Previous Article Post a Comment Community Rules You need to login in order to post a comment Not a member yet? Register Now You may also like: Upcoming Webinar Popular Stories ShinyHunters claims FBI hack, data theft in PeopleSoft zero-day breach Microsoft reminds admins to migrate Entra ID users to passkeys New Windows Defender zero-day blocks Microsoft antivirus updates Sponsor Posts AI is a data-breach time bomb: Read the new report Overdue a password health-check? Audit your Active Directory for free Build cyber resilience with Wazuh: The open-source SIEM & XDR for proactive protection Daily detection, monthly validation, 12-hour clocks. Are you VDR & VER ready? Automate Onboarding and Access Reviews with No-Code IGA: See how it works Follow us: Main Sections News Community Forums Useful Resources Welcome Guide Company About BleepingComputer Terms of Use - Privacy Policy - Ethics Statement - Affiliate Disclosure Copyright @ 2003 - 2026 Bleeping Computer® LLC - All Rights Reserved Login Username Password Remember Me Sign in anonymously Sign in with Twitter Not a member yet? Register Now Help us understand the problem. What is going on with this comment? Spam Abusive or Harmful Inappropriate content Strong language Other Read our posting guidelinese to learn what content is prohibited. Submitting... |
Private GitLab email addresses, which are intended for notifying developers about work items, are being deliberately exposed in public documentation, including READMEs, contributing guides, and support pages. These addresses are generated through a built-in GitLab feature called "Email work item to this project" and are associated with long-lived tokens tied to the developer's account. The addresses contain a specific string, such as ‘glimt-’, which functions as a credential for interacting with the project. Researchers from the application security company Aikido discovered multiple instances of these private GitLab addresses publicly exposed, which poses significant security risks. An attacker who obtains these addresses can exploit them to compromise GitLab accounts. Specifically, by modifying the standard email address suffix from ‘-issue’ to ‘-merge-request,’ the attacker can instruct GitLab to open a merge request on the project. This mechanism allows the attacker to effectively impersonate the token owner, enabling actions that bypass typical security controls. The researchers demonstrated that this method allows an attacker to bypass IP address restrictions. While GitLab does not inherently check if the sending address matches the token owner’s email, and the researchers note that GitLab is currently considering adding this defense, any mailbox on the internet can send messages to that address, and GitLab processes the communication as originating from the token owner. Consequently, the resulting level of access depends on the permissions granted to the user account, potentially allowing the attacker to execute code changes, initiate CI/CD runs, access private repositories, collect secrets from CI/CD variables, or view confidential issues. Furthermore, to fully exploit this vulnerability, an attacker also needs the target project’s path and ID, which are often publicly available in public projects, although they can potentially be brute-forced in private projects if the path is leaked. These exposures create substantial supply-chain risks, particularly for large user bases in popular open-source projects. GitLab warns that these email addresses are private and generated specifically for the user, emphasizing that anyone with knowledge of them can execute actions as if they were the legitimate owner. Therefore, GitLab advises that if any private email address is suspected of leaking, the associated tokens should be immediately reset. Project maintainers are strongly advised to cease voluntarily exposing this information in public documentation and to reset project tokens where such information has been previously exposed. |